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To communicate cooperatively, speakers must determine what constitutes the common
ground with their addressee and adapt their referential choices accordingly. Assessing
another person’s knowledge requires a social cognition ability termed theory of mind
(ToM). This study relies on a novel referential communication task requiring probabilistic
inferences of the knowledge already held by an addressee prior to the study. Forty
participants were asked to present 10 movie characters and the addressee, who had
the same characters in a random order, was asked to place them in order. ToM and other
aspects of social cognition were also assessed. Participants used more information
when presenting likely unknown than likely known movie characters. They particularly
increased their use of physical descriptors, which most often accompanied movie-
related information. Interestingly, a significant relationship emerged between our ToM
test and the increased amount of information given for the likely unknown characters.
These results suggest that speakers use ToM to infer their addressee’s likely knowledge
and accordingly adapt their referential expressions.
Keywords: reference, theory of mind, mentalizing, interactive task, collaboration, common ground, egocentric
bias
Introduction
Models of language production suggest that to communicate cooperatively, speakers must
determine what constitutes the common ground with their addressee and adapt their referential
choices accordingly (Clark et al., 1983). Common ground can be deﬁned as the information
(e.g., knowledge or beliefs) that is shared between a speaker and his addressee. Common ground
information can be shared because of community membership or based on prior common
experiences such as seeing or hearing something together or having previously interacted on the
same topic (Clark et al., 1983). During the course of a conversation, a collaborative speaker can take
common ground into account to adjust the formulation of his references, i.e., formulate references
that will be understood by the addressee yet avoid overly speciﬁc references that take longer to
produce and would violate Grice’s principle of quantity (Grice, 1975).
Even though this adjustment is not perfect, with speakers sometimes using privileged
information (e.g., Horton and Keysar, 1996; Wu and Keysar, 2007), several studies have shown
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that people do adapt their referential expressions to their
addressee. For instance, there is evidence that speakers adjust
their messages when speaking to someone who shows a good
knowledge on a given topic (Isaacs and Clark, 1987), when
speaking to someone with a foreign accent (Kingsburry, 1968,
cited in Krauss, 1987), when speaking to close friends (Fussell
and Krauss, 1985, cited in Krauss, 1987), when speaking to a child
(Brand et al., 2002), or when speaking to someone with previously
established shared knowledge (Galati and Brennan, 2010; Heller
et al., 2012; Gorman et al., 2013).
In their seminal study, Isaacs and Clark (1987) gave pairs of
participants two identical sets of postcards of common New York
scenes. One participant acted as the director who had to describe
the scenes in a predetermined order so that the other participant,
the matcher, could arrange his cards in the same order. Some
matchers had a good knowledge of New York while other
matchers did not. The study showed that the directors quickly
adapted how they presented the postcards depending on their
matcher’s knowledge, using their partner’s responses to adjust
quickly after the beginning of the task. More speciﬁcally, the
directors used more proper names of places when interacting
with expert interlocutors andmore physical descriptions of places
with novice interlocutors.
A more recent study by Heller et al. (2012) also showed that
people adapt the content of their referential expressions based
on the information that is shared or not with their addressee.
In that study, the speakers were asked to help their addressee
identify a series of target shapes among sets of three abstract
shapes. Common ground was manipulated by having pairs of
participants learn together the names of a certain number of
abstract shapes before the task while the speaker learned other
shape names alone. Speakers used more names for the shapes
for which the other participant had also learnt the names.
Interestingly, names were also used for shapes for which only
the participant had learnt the name, but shape names were
in this case typically accompanied by descriptive information,
suggesting that participants were able to distinguish shared from
privileged information. Another study by Gorman et al. (2013)
also used an analogous design and observed similar results.
These studies together suggest that speakers do adapt their
referential expressions depending on the information that is part
of the common ground with their addressee, a phenomenon
sometimes designated as audience design or recipient design
(e.g., Horton and Gerrig, 2002; Newman-Norlund et al., 2009;
Brennan et al., 2010). Audience design has also been reported
for other aspects of communicative behavior, including for
instance adjustments of prosody or intonation, adjustments in
the amount of information provided or in the repetition of the
same information (Grieser and Kuhl, 1988; Brand et al., 2002;
Newman-Norlund et al., 2009). As Heller et al. (2012) observed,
if the verbal production choices made by a speaker depend on
common ground, then during normal everyday conversations
speakers must determine what information is in common
ground with their addressees (i.e., shared information) and
what information is not (i.e., privileged information). Assessing
another person’s mental states, including their state of knowledge
or their beliefs, depends on a social cognition ability called theory
of mind (ToM; also known as mentalizing; Achim et al., 2013a;
Pinkham et al., 2014).
Theory of mind has garnered a lot of attention in
developmental studies, which showed that by the age of four
most children have acquired the ability to assess other people’s
beliefs and distinguish them from their own (Bruneau-Bhérer
et al., 2012). Even once this ability has been acquired, inter-
individual diﬀerences can be observed in how good adults are
at identifying the mental states of others in given situations (ex:
Achim et al., 2012, 2013a; Pinkham et al., 2014). In typical ToM
tasks intended for adult populations, participants are presented
with short stories and are then asked to answer questions
about the characters’ likely mental states, including their beliefs,
knowledge, intentions or emotions, in diﬀerent situations. Such
ToM tasks typically rely on non-interactive materials, however,
and participants have to assess the mental states of ﬁctitious
characters with whom they will never truly interact. In a recent
systematic review (Achim et al., 2013a), we highlighted that very
few studies have assessed ToM during participative interactions
and so we know little of how these abilities are deployed during
real social exchanges.
While the evidence described above shows that speakers adapt
their referential choices based on the addressee’s knowledge,
we are aware of only one study that has directly examined
the relationship between ToM abilities and referential choices
during a realistic verbal interaction. In that study, Champagne-
Lavau et al. (2009) used a referential communication paradigm,
which reproduces a communication situation that implies a social
interaction based on the collaboration between two partners.
Their version of the referential communication paradigm
triggered a conversation around two sets of tangrams (abstract
shapes) that were each discussed on four consecutive occasions.
That study not only conﬁrmed that healthy people adapt their
referential expressions depending on whether the referent has
previously been introduced or not to their addressee (ﬁrst versus
subsequent trials), but also that people with ToM deﬁcits, in
that case a group of patients with schizophrenia, do not adapt
their expressions to the same extent. Moreover, this reduced
adjustment was particularly prominent in patients with more
important deﬁcits on a standard ToM task. However, in that study
it is possible that speakers employed more indeﬁnite markers
on the ﬁrst trial and more deﬁnite markers on the subsequent
trial because of their own increased familiarity with the tangram
shapes as the task progressed. Moreover, the ToM test used
for that study did not allow inter-individual diﬀerences in the
healthy participant’s group to be identiﬁed as the ToM task
used in that study was relatively easy and is known to present
ceiling eﬀects in healthy individuals. Overall, Champagne-Lavau’s
study nonetheless suggested links between ToM abilities and
the adjustment of referential choices, though this relationship
should minimally be conﬁrmed, ideally while controlling for
speakers’ own knowledge and using a referential communication
task that places greater emphasis on the assessment of addressees’
knowledge.
The present study thus had two main objectives. First, we
aimed to examine whether speakers adapt the content of their
referential expressions when the addressee’s knowledge has not
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been previously established and has to be reassessed on an item-
by-item basis for each referent introduced during the task. As
Galati and Brennan (2010, p. 47) have previously observed,
the previous studies that provided evidence for audience design
have typically relied on tasks in which speakers could “represent
relevant aspects of common ground in a simple, clear way.” For
example, previous studies either held the addressee’s knowledge
constant across all items of the task (e.g., the addressee had
an overall good or poor knowledge of New York scenes in the
study by Isaacs and Clark, 1987) or clearly established the other
person’s knowledge before the task (as in the study byHeller et al.,
2012 where participants learned together the names of a certain
number of abstract shapes). It thus remains unclear whether a
spontaneous adjustment to the addressee’s needs would also be
observed for referents that require constant reassessment of the
addressee’s likely knowledge, i.e., for probabilistic evaluations of
common ground. Determining if an adjustment also occurs in
such circumstances is important as during real life conversations,
the referents being mentioned are not restricted to a speciﬁc
stimulus category and can vary widely in terms of the likelihood
that a given addressee will know each referent. In this study,
the referents were movie characters that were discussed for
the ﬁrst time between the speaker and addressee, and these
characters varied in terms of how likely it was that the
addressee would know them. Brown-Schmidt (2012) recently
suggested that common ground can be represented in a graded,
probabilistic way. Though the evidence that she presented to
support her view were derived from an eye-tracking study
during reference interpretation, a probabilistic view of common
ground could certainly also apply to language production.
We thus hypothesized that an adjustment “for-the-addressee”
(Galati and Brennan, 2010) would be observed for each item
of our task such that speakers would use more movie related
information when their addressee is more likely to know the
referent than when he is less likely to know the referent. We
further expected that the movie-related information used for
likely unknown-referents would more often be accompanied
by additional descriptive information, similarly to the pattern
observed by Heller et al. (2012). In order to distinguish
adjustments that occur “for-the-addressee” and adjustments that
occur “for-the-speaker” (i.e., because they are easier for the
speaker to produce), we controlled for participants’ knowledge
when assessing the eﬀect of the addressee’s likely knowledge.
Moreover, we also directly examined adjustments related to the
participants’ own familiarity with the movies, expecting that
participants would use mainly descriptive information to present
movie characters that they themselves did not know but then use
a wider range of information to present characters that they did
know.
Given the suggested relationship between choices of
referential expressions and ToM (e.g., Brennan et al., 2010),
the second objective of this study was to assess the relationship
between the adjustments of referential choices based on an
addressee’s likely knowledge and ToM abilities in healthy
individuals using a more sensitive ToM measure than the one
employed by Champagne-Lavau et al. (2009). Other aspects of
social cognition were also examined in our study including social
knowledge, emotion recognition, and empathic perspective-
taking. We expected a relationship between adjustment of verbal
productions to the addressee’s likely knowledge and both ToM
and empathic perspective-taking. In contrast, we did not predict
a strong relationship with our measures of social knowledge or
emotion recognition as these tests assess lower-level aspects of
social cognition that are less directly related to social functioning
(Achim et al., 2012, 2013b).
Materials and Methods
Participants
Forty participants took part in this study. All were native French
speakers aged between 18 and 40 years old (mean age = 24.2;
32 men; mean education = 14.2 years). Participants were not
included in the study if they reported a history of neurological
disorder, head trauma or psychiatric disorder or if taking a
psychoactive medication. The local ethics board approved the
study and all participants signed an informed consent.
Procedure
Because our experimental task is based on movies (see below),
participants ﬁrst completed a movie knowledge questionnaire,
then completed a social cognition assessment (as well as
additional tests and questionnaires not reported here) and ﬁnally
performed our experimental task. Our assessments are presented
in more details below.
Experimental Task
The current project is based on the referential communication
paradigm (e.g., Clark et al., 1983; Champagne-Lavau et al.,
2009). An opaque screen is placed between the two partners to
prevent non-verbal communication during the verbal interaction
and both partners are presented with an identical set of image
cards. For this study, participants received 10 image cards in a
predetermined order whereas their addressee received 10 cards
with the same images in a random order, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Participants had to present each card in the given order so that
their addressee could replace his set in the same order. The
addressee could give some feedback to signal understanding (e.g.,
“ok”) or to point out misunderstandings or ambiguities (e.g., “can
you give me more details”), and the participant could provide
additional information.
The addressee was always a woman in her twenties, and
the material consisted of 10 images of movie characters, all
male (see Table 1), taken from movies that can either safely
be assumed to be known by a woman in her twenties (the
likely known condition, ﬁve images) or not safely assumed to
be known by a woman in her twenties (the likely unknown
condition, ﬁve images). Classiﬁcation of the movies into the
likely known or likely unknown categories was conﬁrmed by
two surveys. The ﬁrst survey included 27 movies titles. Thirty-
three participants (aged between 20 and 30 years old, 14 men)
indicated if they had seen the movie or not and whether they
would assume that most women in their 20s had seen the movie.
This allowed us to eliminate the movies for which there was
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the procedure used for this study. The participant (on the left) has 10 images placed in a predetermined order. The addressee (on the
right) has the same images in a random order and has to replace them in the correct order based on the verbal utterances of the participants.
TABLE 1 | List of characters that the participants had to present.
Character Movie
Likely-known condition
Harry Potter Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone
Jack Sparrow Pirates of the Caribbean
E.T. E.T. The Extra-Terrestrial
Gandalf The Lord of the Rings
Maximus Gladiator
Likely-unknown condition
Leonidas 300
Martin Riggs Lethal Weapon
Don Vito Corleone The Godfather
Wolverine X-men
Alex A Clockwork Orange
little agreement on whether it was likely known or not (nine
movies) and those that had been seen by too few people (six
movies). For the remaining 12 movies, we performed a second
survey in which 54 participants (aged between 18 and 30 years
old, 32 men) were again questioned about the movies but also
about the main male characters in each movie, conﬁrming that
the movies and their main characters were correctly classiﬁed
into the likely known (ﬁve movies) and likely unknown (seven
movies) categories. From these 12 movies, 10 were selected
for our ﬁnal stimulus set (ﬁve likely known and ﬁve likely
unknown).
The role of the addressee was here held by a trained research
assistant to standardize the feedback given for the diﬀerent items
in the card set (see below). To avoid that the participants assume
all image cards to be known from the assistant-addressee (i.e., the
assistant could learn the name of a likely unknown characters
when administering the task), a concealment strategy was
developed to make the participants believe that their addressee
did the task with diﬀerent images for each participant (when in
fact the same 10 images were always used). More speciﬁcally, the
images were presented in a sealed envelope allegedly prepared
by another research assistant and participants were told that
their addressee had previously done the task but each time
with a diﬀerent set of images, so they had not been exposed
to the images that were in the envelop in the context of the
study. A pilot study previously conﬁrmed the success of this
strategy, with none of the 10 pilot subjects reporting suspecting
that the addressee was familiar with the material used for the
task.
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During the task, participants were asked to present the
characters to the addressee one at a time. The addressee knew
all the characters in the likely known condition and acted as if
she did not know the characters in the likely unknown condition.
More speciﬁcally, she was trained to ignore any movie-related
information provided for the characters in the likely unknown
condition (ex: character’s name or role in the movie, or movie
title) regardless of her own knowledge. She was allowed to give
verbal feedback, for example saying “ok” or asking for additional
information, but was asked to never mention any information
about the characters. This material and procedure was created so
that participants had to take into consideration the knowledge
that they can attribute to the addressee for each of the diﬀerent
movie characters (i.e., which movie character’s are likely known
by their addressee) on an image-by-image basis in order to
produce appropriate referential information. Participants were
requested not to name the actors, and to really focus on the
characters.
Movie Knowledge Questionnaire
A self-report movie questionnaire was administered to
determine, for each movie from which we had extracted our
stimuli, whether the participant had seen it or not. Participants
who reported seeing the movie were also asked how long ago
they had seen it and to estimate the percentage of women
between 20 and 30 years old in Quebec they thought had also
seen the movie. This movie knowledge questionnaire was always
done ﬁrst followed by the social cognition assessment, the other
measures not reported here and then the experimental task.
This order was chosen because doing the questionnaire after
the task may have led the participants to answer based on their
experience with the addressee during the task, and also because
we wanted to introduce a delay between the questionnaire and
the experimental task (at least 90 min to complete the full set of
other measures).
Social Cognition Assessment
Our social cognition assessment included measures of ToM,
social knowledge and emotion recognition, measured with the
tests from the Batterie Intégrée de Cognition Sociale (BICS;
Achim et al., 2012) and empathic perspective-taking measured
with the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980).
Theory of Mind Assessment
The combined stories test from the BICS (Achim et al., 2012) is
a validated ToM measure that includes a combination of stories
that cover attributions of a full range of mental states, including
beliefs/knowledge, intentions/desires, and emotions. Each item
consists of a short story depicting at least two characters involved
in a speciﬁc situation. For each item, participants are asked
to read the story aloud and are then asked one or two open
ToM questions per story. Answers to these questions require
making inferences about the characters’ mental states (e.g., their
intentions, beliefs, knowledge, or emotions), and answers are
scored 2, 1, or 0 points according to a validated correction grid.
A score of 2 is given for a complete and explicit answer that
takes the mental states of the characters into account, a score
of 1 reﬂects an incomplete answer, and a score of 0 an incorrect
answer. This test was selected because it includes a large number
of items and does not suﬀer from a ceiling eﬀect in healthy
participants (Achim et al., 2012, 2013b; Lavoie et al., 2014).
Social Knowledge Assessment
Social knowledge was assessed by presenting 14 hypothetical
situations and asking participants how people in general would
react in these situations. The situations include for example
“Someone who learns that he has been lied to.” Answers were
scored 0 or 1 point according to a validated correction grid
(Achim et al., 2012).
Emotion Recognition Assessment
Emotion recognition was assessed by presenting 14 emotional
facial expressions (Ekman and Friesen, 1976) and asking
participants to identify, from seven possible labels, which
emotion is being expressed. One point was given for a correct
answer and 0 for incorrect answers.
Perspective-Taking
Perspective-taking was assessed with the IRI (Davis, 1980), a
widely used self-report questionnaire that includes four scales
that measure four aspects of empathy: (1) Perspective taking; (2)
Fantasy; (3) Empathic concern; and (4) Personal distress. The
Perspective taking scale was of particular interest here. This scale
includes seven items for which participants have to determine to
what extent each statement describes them and provide a rating
on a ﬁve-point scale (from 0 – does not describe me well to
4 – describes me very well). It includes items such as “Before
criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in
their place.” Validity of the IRI has been well documented (Davis,
1983).
Data Processing and Analyses
For the experimental task, the interactions were tape-recorded
and then transcribed verbatim. For each of the 10 images,
we coded each piece of information provided to present each
character according to whether it was (a) the character’s name
(e.g., “Jack Sparrow”); (b) the title of themovie with that character
(e.g., “Pirates of the Caribbean”); (c) the role of the character
in the movie (e.g., “a Pirate”); (d) a physical descriptor (e.g.,
“has a red shirt”). It was often the case that multiple pieces of
information were provided for the same character (e.g., it’s a
pirate with a red shirt, his name is Jack Sparrow”) and all pieces
of information were taken into account in our coding, excluding,
however, the information added after a clariﬁcation demand
from the addressee (i.e., only the spontaneous presentations
made for each character were subjected to our analyses) since
we wanted to focus on the utterances produced in advance of
explicit verbal feedback about the communicative success or
failure.
The variables retained for analyses included: (1) the number of
pieces of information provided per character; (2) the proportion
of trials that included each of the four types of information
content, including physical descriptors as well as each of the
three types of movie-related information (i.e., names, movie
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titles and roles); and, given some trials included more than one
type of information, (3) the context in which descriptors or
movie-related information were used including the proportion
of cases where participants employed physical descriptors only
(descriptors without movie information), movie information
only (without physical descriptors, but including some trials
with more than one type of movie information, for example
name and movie title) or descriptors in combination with movie
related information. Given the limited number of trials in this
study, we chose to combine together in that third category trials
in which the movie information was followed by descriptors
and trials in which description was followed by movie related
information.
Even if we were primarily interested in the adjustment
for the addressee, we recognize that an adjustment is also
likely to occur for the participant himself (i.e., because some
information is easier for the participants to produce) and we
thus aimed to assess both the eﬀect of the likely known or
likely unknown nature of the stimuli for the addressee and
the eﬀect of the participant’s personal knowledge of the movie
characters.
Participants had seen a vast majority of the likely known
movies, leaving too few unseen likely known movies for an
eventual 2 × 2 analysis of variance that would incorporate
personal knowledge and likely knowledge of the addressee in a
single analysis. For this reason, our strategy to distinguish the
eﬀect of the participant’s personal knowledge and the eﬀect of the
addressee’s likely knowledge was the following.
For each of our variables, t-test were used to (1) compare
movies that participants had seen versus not seen, performed
only on the likely unknown trials to control for the addressee’s
likely knowledge and (2) compare likely known versus likely
unknown characters, performed only for the movies that the
participant had seen in order to control for their personal
knowledge. This strategy was crucial to be able to distinguish
the eﬀect of the participant’s personal knowledge from the
eﬀect of their evaluation of the addressee’s likely knowledge.
However, for the comparison of likely known versus likely
unknown it led to the exclusion of ﬁve participants who had
seen none of the likely unknown movies. For the comparison
of seen versus not seen movies, it also led to the exclusion of
the same ﬁve participants who had seen no likely unknown
movies plus four others who had seen all the likely unknown
movies.
Another important consideration is that because
of the small number of trials involved, the data were
not satisfactorily distributed for a reliable parametric
assessment of the null hypothesis for our paired t-tests.
The probability of the observed t-value under the hypothesis
that participant’s personal knowledge or addressee’s likely
knowledge did not matter was thus assessed from the
rank of its absolute value of t among absolute values of t
obtained for random reassignment of signs to the observed
diﬀerences. Typically, 1000 random sign reassignments
were performed. If, however, the observed rank was then
within the 95% conﬁdence interval of the set signiﬁcance
threshold (alpha = 0.05), the number of sign reassignments
was raised to 20000 to get a ﬁner evaluation of the
probability.
In a second step, we also assessed the correlations between
(1) the degree of adjustment computed for each subject and
each variable by contrasting the two trial categories (i.e.,
score on the variable for likely known characters minus score
for likely unknown characters; or score on the variable for
seen movies minus score for unseen movies), and (2) the
scores on our four social cognition measures, namely the
ToM performance scores from the Combined Stories task, the
Perspective-Taking scores from the IRI, the social knowledge
performance scores, and the emotion recognition performance
scores. Here again, we used permutations to better estimate
the probability of the observed correlations. If social cognition
abilities such as ToM indeed contribute to the assessment
of common ground and hence to reference adjustments,
participants with better social cognition performance should
show more pronounced adjustment as a function of the
addressee’s likely knowledge, and be less inﬂuenced by their own
knowledge.
Results
Results from the Movie Questionnaire
Participants had seen between 1 and 10 movies, with a mean
of 6.7 movies (SD = 2.3) per participant (only 15% of our
participants had seen less than half of the movies). When
considering separately our likely known and likely unknown
movies, participants had seen a mean of 4.3 likely known movies
(SD= 1.2) and 2.6 likely unknown movies (SD= 1.6).
When asked to determine the proportion of women in
their twenties having seen the movies (asked only for movies
the participants had themselves seen), the expected pattern of
responses was observed, with the movies previously classiﬁed as
likely known more often considered as having been seen by a
majority of women in their twenties (65.6%) than the movies
previously classiﬁed as likely unknown (16.1%).
Results for the Number of Pieces of
Information
As presented in Table 2, the number of pieces of information
included when presenting the characters was not signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by participants’ own knowledge but was signiﬁcantly
inﬂuenced by the addressees’ likely knowledge.
Interestingly, this adjustment to the addressees’ likely
knowledge was signiﬁcantly correlated to performances on the
ToM test, such that participants with better ToM abilities showed
a greater increase in the amount of information provided for the
likely unknown characters relative to the likely known characters.
This correlation was strong enough to survive a Bonferroni
correction for multiple testing (see Table 2). No other signiﬁcant
correlations were observed between our other social cognition
measures and the number of pieces of information, but the
correlations with the Perspective taking scale are nonetheless
included in Table 2 given our a priori hypotheses for this
measure.
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TABLE 2 | Effect of the participant’s personal knowledge (seen or not
seen) and of the addressee’s likely knowledge (likely known or likely
unknown) on the number of pieces of information.
Number of pieces of
information per
character
Paired t-test Correlation
ToM1
Correlation
IRI-PT1
Seen Not seen
2.27 2.55 t(30) = 1.37,
N.S.
r = 0.23,
N.S.
r = 0.02,
N.S.
Likely
known
Likely
unknown
1.79 2.29 t(34) = 3.45,
p < 0.001
r = −0.47,
p < 0.003
r = −0.29,
N.S.
ToM, Theory of Mind. IRI-PT, the empathic perspective-taking scale from the
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980).
1A positive correlation means that participants with a higher score on the social
cognition measures used relatively more information for the Seen or for the Likely
known conditions, while a negative correlation reflects that they used relatively more
information for the Not seen or the Likely unknown condition.
Results for the Four Types of Information
Content
Table 3 shows that when the participants had not seen the
movie they most often used physical descriptors whereas for
movies they had seen they most often employed movie related
information, in particular the characters’ names and movie
titles. For the movies that the participants had seen, there was
nonetheless an adjustment to the addressee’s likely knowledge.
First, participants more often used physical descriptors for
likely unknown characters. Second, though there was no overall
diﬀerence in the use of movie related information between
likely known and likely unknown characters (when considering
together either names, roles, or movie titles), the type of movie
related information being used was aﬀected by the addressee’s
likely knowledge. More precisely, names were more often used
for likely known characters whereas movie titles were more often
used for likely unknown characters (see Table 3).
No signiﬁcant correlation was observed between the
adjustment in these measures and performance on the social
cognition tests. Given our a priori hypotheses, the correlation
results are nonetheless included in Table 3 for ToM and
Perspective taking.
These ﬁrst analyses included all information provided without
taking into account its place in the sequence. Additional analyses
were thus conducted while considering only the ﬁrst element
of information mentioned for each trial, looking at the eﬀect of
the likely known versus likely unknown characters manipulation
(e.g., only the name was considered if a character was presented
by his name followed by a physical description). These analyses
showed that participants more often started their presentation
with physical descriptors for likely unknown trials (23%) than for
the likely known trials (12%), although this eﬀect did not reach
signiﬁcance [t(34)= 2.0, p< 0.055]. Similarly, participants more
often started their presentation with names for the likely known
characters (58%) than likely unknown characters (44%), although
this eﬀect was also only at a trend level [t(34) = 1.72, p < 0.067].
There was no evidence of an eﬀect for movie titles (p = 0.80) or
for roles (p= 0.45), and the eﬀect for any movie information did
not reach signiﬁcance (p= 0.14).
Results for the Combinations of Information
Results regarding the combinations of information used to
present the characters are shown in Table 4. Movie information
alone (i.e., without the addition of physical descriptors) was more
often observed for movies that the participant had seen, and there
was also an eﬀect of the addressee’s knowledge such that movie
information was more often used alone to present likely known
than likely unknown movie characters.
Interestingly, participants also more often used movie
information accompanied by description when they had seen
TABLE 3 | Effect of the participant’s personal knowledge (seen or not seen) and of the addressee’s likely knowledge (likely known or likely unknown) on
the use of four types of information content.
Proportion of characters with use of: Paired t-test1 Correlation ToM2 Correlation IRI-PT2
Seen Not seen
Physical descriptors 0.51 0.79 t(30) = 3.83, p < 0.001 r = 0.06, N.S. r = −0.15, N.S.
Any movie information 0.90 0.43 t(30) = 6.12, p < 0.001 r = −0.11, N.S. r = −0.17, N.S.
Names 0.48 0.08 t(30) = 5.17, p < 0.001 r = 0.07, N.S. r = 0.09, N.S.
Movie titles 0.50 0.29 t(30) = 2.79, p < 0.03 r = 0.10, N.S. r = −0.00, N.S.
Roles 0.24 0.13 t(30) = 1.79, N.S. r = 0.04, N.S. r = −0.21, N.S.
Likely known Likely unknown
Physical descriptors 0.36 0.55 t(34) = 3.43, p < 0.001 r = −0.14, N.S. r = −0.23, N.S.
Any movie information 0.89 0.87 t(34) = 0.60, N.S. r = −0.16, N.S. r = 0.33, N.S.
Names 0.65 0.47 t(34) = 2.72, p < 0.016 r = 0.12, N.S. r = −0.04, N.S.
Movie titles 0.27 0.45 t(34) = 2.64, p < 0.021 r = −0.24, N.S. r = 0.06, N.S.
Roles 0.21 0.27 t(34) = 1.49, N.S. r = −0.30, N.S. r = 0.01, N.S.
ToM, Theory of Mind. IRI-PT, the empathic perspective-taking scale from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980). 1Participants who did not have data in both
categories for a given comparison were excluded from the analyses. 2A positive correlation means that participants with a higher score on the social cognition measures
used relatively more of the targeted information type for the Seen or for the Likely known conditions, while a negative correlation reflects that they used relatively more of
that information type for the Not seen or the Likely unknown condition.
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TABLE 4 | Effect of the participant’s personal knowledge (seen or not seen) and of the addressee’s likely knowledge (likely known or likely unknown) on
the combinations of information types.
Proportions of characters presented with: Paired t-test1 Correlation ToM2 Correlation IRI-PT2
Seen Not seen
Movie information only 0.48 0.17 t(30) = 4.01, p < 0.001 r = −0.10, N.S. r = 0.15, N.S.
Movie information and description 0.41 0.23 t(30) = 2.11, p < 0.046 r = −0.02, N.S. r = −0.25, N.S.
Description only 0.09 0.49 t(30) = 5.35, p < 0.001 r = 0.08, N.S. r = 0.05, N.S.
Likely known Likely unknown
Movie information only 0.62 0.44 t(34) = 2.84, p < 0.007 r = 0.16, N.S. r = 0.19, N.S.
Movie information and description 0.27 0.42 t(34) = 2.41, p < 0.022 r = −0.26, N.S. r = 0.02, N.S.
Description only 0.08 0.12 t(34) = 0.85, N.S. r = 0.19, N.S. r = −0.29, N.S.
ToM, Theory of Mind. IRI-PT, the empathic perspective-taking scale from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980).
1Participants who did not have data in both categories for a given comparison were excluded from the analyses. 2A positive correlation means that participants with
a higher score on the social cognition measures used relatively more of the targeted information type for the Seen or for the Likely known conditions, while a negative
correlation reflects that they used relatively more of that information type for the Not seen or the Likely unknown condition.
the movie than when they had not seen it, but this time the
opposite pattern was observed when considering the addressee’s
likely knowledge. Such combinations of movie information
and description were indeed more often employed when the
addressee was unlikely to know the character.
On the other hand, the use of description only (i.e., without
movie information) was signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced only by the
participants’ own knowledge and not by the addressee’s likely
knowledge.
No signiﬁcant correlation was observed between adjustment
in these measures and performance on the social cognition
tests. Given our a priori hypotheses, the correlation results are
nonetheless included in Table 4 for ToM and Perspective taking.
Discussion
This study examined the eﬀect of speakers’ personal knowledge
and of their addressee’s likely knowledge on the referential
expressions produced during a collaborative referential
communication task. The task asked participants to verbally
present movie characters to their addressee who had to identify
these characters and place them in order. During the task,
participants’ referential expressions were inﬂuenced not only
by their own knowledge but also by their addressee’s likely
knowledge of the characters, even if their addressee’s knowledge
of the characters had not been previously established and was
thus only probabilistic. Interestingly, a signiﬁcant relationship
emerged between performance on a ToM test and the increased
amount of information given for the likely unknown characters.
These results suggest that speakers use ToM to infer their
addressee’s likely knowledge and accordingly adapt their
referential expressions during verbal interactions.
Referential Choices and Addressee’s Likely
Knowledge
When presenting characters that were likely unknown from their
addressee, participants spontaneously used a greater amount of
information and in particular increased their use of physical
descriptors. Interestingly, these physical descriptors were most
often employed in combination with movie-related information.
These results replicate Heller et al.’s (2012) ﬁndings in showing
that speakers are not strictly Gricean in their choices of referring
expressions, often choosing to over specify their expressions
by including information that was not previously in common
ground with their addressee. Just as participants used shape
names that their addressee had not learned in the study by
Heller et al. (2012) here the participants used movie related
information even when the addressee was unlikely to know
the movie character. In fact, when the participant knew the
characters, they infrequently used only physical description,
doing so for only 8% of the likely known trials and 12% of
the likely unknown trials, with no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
these two conditions. Despite these low amounts of trials with
only descriptive information, our data provide evidence that
speakers took their addressee’s likely knowledge of the characters
into account. When presenting characters that were likely not
known by their addressee, participants spontaneously produced
more instances of movie information accompanied by physical
description and fewer instances of movie information without
physical description, this adjustment occurring in advance of
the clariﬁcation demands from the addressee. Overall, these
results suggest that the addressee’s likely knowledge was indeed
taken into account by speakers for the production of their
referential expressions even if the addressee’s knowledge has not
been previously established and thus remained probabilistic. This
observation is in line with Brown-Schmidt’s (2012) suggestion of
a gradient representation of common ground that goes beyond
the “is in common ground” or “is in privileged ground” dichotomy.
While the participants were sensitive to their addressee’s likely
knowledge, there was always a chance that the addressee would
know the characters, even for the ones who are less well known.
It is thus possible that acknowledgment of that possibility by
our participants made them use more movie related information.
This idea would also be consistent with the observation that
the proportion of trials presented using only description was
lower in this study relative to the previous study by Heller
et al. (2012) where some shapes were certain not to be known
from the addressee, being abstract shapes introduced to the
speaker speciﬁcally for the experimental task. Another possibility
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is that the participants in this study may have wanted to display
their movie-related knowledge to their partner during the social
interaction. While providing too little information in the context
of this type of task may be seen as reﬂecting lesser collaborative
tendencies, providing more information does not prevent the
addressee from identifying the character and could even promote
social interactions in a real-life context.
It is also quite interesting that the type of movie-related
information being used in our study diﬀered depending on the
likely known or likely unknown nature of the stimuli, a result
that we had not initially expected. The results revealed that while
names were, as predicted, more often used for likely known
characters, movie titles were in contrast used more often for
likely unknown characters. Because this eﬀect disappeared when
considering only the ﬁrst information provided for each trial,
it suggests that movie titles were added after another initial
piece of information, for example saying “it is Wolverine from
the movie X-man.” It is thus possible that movie titles were
thought to have a greater chance of being known by the addressee
than the character’s names for these likely unknown trials. In
real life, people often hear about movies that they have not
necessarily seen, and having even a vague recollection of what the
movie is about could potentially help the addressee to distinguish
between the diﬀerent characters. We cannot, however, exclude
that the participants could have had more diﬃculty recollecting
the names of the characters that are less well known, a possibility
that would have to be controlled for in future studies. However,
regardless of whether the type of movie related information
used was linked to the addressee’s likely knowledge or to the
participant’s own ability to recollect the information about the
characters, it remains that participants adapted their references
to their addressee by more often including relevant physical
descriptors to which their addressee had visual access when
presenting likely unknown characters. This observation clearly
suggests an adjustment for the addressee even when the other
person’s knowledge is probabilistic and varies for diﬀerent items
that the speaker and addressee encounter together for the ﬁrst
time.
Isaacs and Clark (1987) had previously shown that speakers
adapt the content of their referential expressions based on the
knowledge that their addressee held prior to any interaction
around the task material. In their study, however, they did
not distinguish between the likely knowledge of diﬀerent items.
What diﬀered was instead the addressee’s general knowledge
of the whole set of stimulus images, in that case New York
scenes. The adjustment thus did not have to be readjusted on
an item-by-item basis. Here, we showed that participants can
continuously adapt their verbal productions depending on the
likely knowledge linked to each individual image in a card set.
The adjustment that we observed thus deﬁnitely goes beyond the
use of a simple information overlap heuristic where the speaker
would be inﬂuenced by how much knowledge he shares overall
with his addressee, as was previously suggested byWu and Keysar
(2007).
The timing of the adjustment would, however, require
further investigation as it remains unclear if the adjustments
observed in this study were initially prepared or rather
occurred through monitoring and adjustment mechanisms. The
exploratory analyses on the ﬁrst pieces of information provided
for each trial showed a trend-level eﬀect of the addressee’s
likely knowledge, with more descriptions and less characters’
names as ﬁrst pieces of information for likely unknown movies.
These eﬀects were, however, more pronounced and signiﬁcant
when considering all the information provided by the speaker,
making it hard to distinguish if these additional information
were initially planned or added later in the verbal production
process. While this question would require further investigation,
a recent magneto-encephalography study has provided evidence
that some brain regions involved in collaborative interactions get
activated even before the collaborative task trials, when subjects
receives evidence that common ground knowledge necessary for
the task is going to be needed shortly (Stolk et al., 2013).
Referential Choices and Theory of Mind (ToM)
An important ﬁnding of this study is that better ToM
performance was related to a greater adjustment to the
addressee’s likely knowledge. These results thus support the
idea that speakers can use their ToM abilities to infer
their addressee’s likely knowledge and accordingly adapt their
referential expressions. Even if it is widely recognized that
speakers use information about what is in common ground
with their addressee during verbal interactions, very few studies
have directly tested the involvement of the cognition processes
allowing a proper evaluation of other people’s knowledge, i.e.,
social cognition processes. Among the diﬀerent social cognition
processes, ToM is thought to be more closely related to everyday
interactions because it allows mental state inferences while
ﬂexibly taking into account all available information about the
person and about the context in which that person is placed. It
is also more closely linked to everyday functioning in clinical
populations such as patients with schizophrenia (Fett et al., 2011;
Achim et al., 2012, 2013b), suggesting that this ability is important
for everyday interactions. In this study, the addressee’s likely
knowledge had to be inferred for each item of the experimental
task, as it was not formerly established before the task as in Heller
et al. (2012) and it was not constant across task items as in Isaacs
and Clark (1987). Given that our participants had to continuously
assess their addressee’s knowledge for each item during the task,
it is understandable that the ToM measure was the one that
showed a signiﬁcant correlation with the adjustment of the
referential expressions to the addressee’s inferred knowledge in
the current task. Though we were also expecting a link with
the empathic perspective-taking questionnaire, this relationship
was in the expected direction but did not reach signiﬁcance. It
remains unclear whether this lack of a signiﬁcant relationship
with perspective-taking was linked to the nature of our measure
(i.e., a self-report questionnaire) or to the lack of statistical power
to detectmore subtle eﬀects. Studies with greater sample sizes and
greater number of trials would deﬁnitely be required to answer
that question.
Limitations
The limitations of this study include that the number of stimulus
items was limited, which required using random permutations to
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provide a proper estimate of the probability for our t-values. This
study provides initial evidence for an adjustment to an addressee’s
likely knowledge, but future studies should deﬁnitely reproduce
these results using a greater number of items. Also, our group
of participants was relatively small, which may have limited in
particular the ability to detect signiﬁcant correlations.
Another important limitation of this study is that we used
the information regarding whether participants had seen the
movie or not as a proxy for knowing the characters (i.e., we
distinguished characters from movies that the participants had
seen or not seen). As such, we did not have access to information
regarding the knowledge that our participants had of the names,
movie titles and roles associated to each character in our stimulus
set. It is thus likely that our participants in fact knew some of the
characters from the movies they had not seen, an idea supported
by the observation that participants sometimes used movie-
related information for characters from movie that they had not
seen. It is also likely that some participant knew only part of the
movie related information for some characters from movies they
had seen, for example not remembering the character’s name but
remembering his role and the movie title. Furthermore, it is also
possible that our participants sometimes incorrectly estimated
their addressee’s likely knowledge. These factors could certainly
be taken into account in future studies, which could lead to the
detection of stronger eﬀects.
This study could have also been limited by the use
of a confederate who acted as the addressee (Kuhlen and
Brennan, 2013). The decision to use a confederate was taken
because we wished to control for the knowledge displayed
by the addressee and the feedback given to the diﬀerent
participants, reﬂecting knowledge of all likely known movie
characters, and absence of knowledge for all likely unknown
characters. In fact, the addressee was familiar with all the
characters before the task, which may have inﬂuenced their
pattern of feedback (Kuhlen and Brennan, 2013). However,
the inﬂuence of their actual knowledge could have only
suggested an increased knowledge for the likely unknown
characters, hence reducing the diﬀerence between likely known
and likely unknown characters. The fact that signiﬁcant
eﬀects were nonetheless observed leads us to believe that
this strategy did not have a detrimental eﬀect in the present
study.
In addition, it remains possible that the timing of the
addressee’s feedback could have inﬂuenced the results. The
addressees received no speciﬁc instructions regarding the timing
of their feedback and it is possible that even short silences could
have been taken by the speakers as reﬂecting confusion and hence
a need for further information, possibly prompting the addition
of additional information by the speaker.
Another limitation of this study is that it included too few
women to reliably address the question of possible diﬀerences
in choices of referential expressions between men and women.
Exploration of the results separately in men and women
suggested similar patterns in both genders for the amount of
information provided per character and for the combinations of
information used to present the characters, although the eﬀects
did not typically reach signiﬁcance in the small group of women.
While some of the eﬀects observed in the whole group for the
diﬀerent types of movie-related information did not seem to
emerge in women (i.e., the eﬀects for names and for movie-titles),
it is unclear if eventual gender diﬀerences would be linked to
the participants’ gender per see, or to the very limited number of
likely unknown movies that most of these women actually knew.
This question would deﬁnitely deserve further investigation in
a study including a greater number of women with diﬀerent
patterns of personal knowledge of movie characters.
Conclusion
Despite the reported limitations, a signiﬁcant and interesting
pattern of results emerged showing that our participants were
sensitive to their addressee’s likely knowledge. These results
add to the ﬁeld by showing that speakers adapt their verbal
productions to their addressee even when common ground
is probabilistic, a result that we observed while taking the
participant’s own knowledge into account. In addition, the results
of the current study suggest that this adjustment to the addressee
takes the form of an increased amount of information provided
when the addresseemay not know the referent, which was done in
advance of the clariﬁcation demands from the addressee and was
linked to participant’s ToM abilities. This relationship with ToM
abilities is an important observation, as such a link with verbal
production had been previously proposed (Brennan et al., 2010)
but not formerly demonstrated in healthy participants.
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